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Abstract This paper presents a hybrid 
cryptographic protocol, using quantum and 
classical resources, for authentication and 
authorization in a network.  One or more trusted 
servers distribute streams of entangled photons 
to individual resources that seek to 
communicate.  It is assumed that each resource 
shares a previously distributed secret key with 
the trusted server, and that resources can 
communicate with the server using both classical 
and quantum channels.  Resources do not share 
secret keys with each other, so that the key 
distribution problem for the network is reduced 
from to .  Some advantages of the 
protocol are that it avoids the requirement for 
timestamps used in classical protocols, 
guarantees that the trusted server cannot know 
the authentication key, can provide resistance to 
multiple photon attacks [Brassard et al., 1999; 
Felix et al., 2001] and can be used with BB84 
[Bennett84] or other quantum key distribution 
protocols.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Controlling access to a large network of 
resources is one of the most common security 
problems.  Familiar examples of authentication 
include the process of supplying a password to 
gain access to a computer, or use of a personal 
identification number (PIN) with an automatic 
teller machine.  The user seeking authentication 
must provide some ticket that cannot be held by 
anyone else, either because user and system 
shared the secret at some point in the past, or 
both received the secret from some trusted third 
party with assurance that the communication was 
not intercepted. 
 
Any pair of parties in a network should be able 
to communicate, but must be authorized to do so, 
which requires that their identities be 
authenticated.  The fundamental problem is how 
to authenticate resources to each other while 
minimizing the number of cryptographic keys 
that must be distributed and maintained, given 
the potential for  pairs of 
communicating resources.  Conventional 
solutions are typically based on authentication 
protocols such as Kerberos or public key 
schemes, which use trusted servers to grant 
authentication tickets or certificates to the 
communicating parties.  Less sophisticated 
examples include the use of simple passwords on 
a network.  Password or authentication key 
transmission may or may not be encrypted, 
depending on the level of risk. 
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This paper describes a solution based on a 
combination of quantum cryptography and a 
conventional secret key system (although a 
public key system could be used for the classical 
component as well).  A novel feature of this 
approach is that even the trusted server cannot 
know the contents of the authentication ticket.  
Using quantum cryptography also avoids the 
need for timestamps and key expiration periods.  
 
1.1 Protocol Description 
 
This section describes the protocol under 
idealized conditions.  A following section 
discusses the impact of transmission losses, 
detection rates and other limiting factors of 
physical implementations.  We assume that each 
resource shares a secret key with a trusted server 
that an eavesdropper can read but not modify 
messages, and that resources can communicate 
with the trusted server over a classical and 
quantum channel.  We also assume that the 
trusted server can be, in fact, trusted.   
 
1. On the classical channel Alice sends a 
message to the trusted server, Tr, 
encrypted under Alice’s secret key, 
indicating the party, Bob, that Alice 
seeks to communicate with.  (A 
classical communication channel is 
suggested here, but the only 
requirement is that parties be able to 
communicate securely with the trusted 
server.  Any form of secure 
communication could be used.  
Authentication between Alice and the 
trusted server is also required, and can 
be accomplished through a variety of 
existing classical protocols that are not 
described here. ) 
2. Using the secret keys shared with Alice 
and Bob, Tr sends to Alice and Bob the 
location, basis, and polarization of 
tamper detection bits. 
3. On the quantum channels Tr sends a 
stream of k pairs of authentication key 
bits along with d pairs of randomly 
interspersed tamper detection bits.  
Each key bit is one half of a entangled 
pair of photons in the state 
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4. One photon of each pair goes to Alice 
and its twin to Bob.  The tamper 
detection bit pairs are polarized 
randomly, according to a sequence of 
randomly selected bases.  Each photon 
in a pair is polarized in the same 
direction as the other; one is sent to 
Alice and its twin to Bob.  
 
5. Alice and Bob measure key photons 
according to a pre-determined basis, 
known to all communicating parties, 
and tamper detection photons according 
to the sequence of bases received from 
Tr, producing a sequence of 
authentication key bits and tamper 
detection bits. 
  
Key bits measurement: Since the key 
bits are entangled, Bob will observe the 
same measurement seen by Alice.   
  
Tamper detection bits measurement: 
With zero transmission loss and perfect 
detection, the tamper detection bits will 
match Tr’s message with 100% 
accuracy.  If an eavesdropper, Eve, has 
read the message the error rate for 
tamper detection bits will be 25%, since 
she has a 50% chance of guessing the 
correct basis, and a 50% chance that 
Alice and Bob will measure the correct 
polarization even if Eve chooses the 
wrong basis.  In a practical 
implementation, the error threshold for 
tamper detection bits should be set as 
close to 0 as practical, for reasons 
discussed in a subsequent section.  If 
the error rate for tamper detection bits 
exceeds the error threshold, the protocol 
is restarted. 
 
  
6. To authenticate her identity to Bob, 
Alice sends to Bob the result of 
measuring the key bit sequence to 
provide confidence (with probability 
) that the message is from Alice.  
The authentication key effectively 
serves as a session password, which is 
sent in the clear.  Note that Alice may 
send only a portion of the key bit 
sequence, sufficient to authenticate her 
identity, while retaining the rest to be 
used as a shared secret key.  That is, the 
protocol can incorporate key 
distribution as well as authentication.  
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7. Bob compares his measurement of the 
photon stream received from Tr with 
the result sent by Alice.  A perfect 
match authenticates Alice.   
 
 
After step 6, Alice and Bob share a bit sequence 
resulting from their measurement of the key 
photons, and even Tr cannot know the bit 
sequence for the bits that were measured because 
the measurement result is not transmitted.  Note 
also that after step 6, Eve will gain nothing by 
decrypting communications between the trusted 
server and Alice and Bob, because knowing the 
location of tamper detection bits is of no value 
after measurements are made on the key bits.  
This information needs to be protected for only a 
few seconds or milliseconds, making it possible 
– with sufficient key length – to resist attacks 
from even a quantum computer.   
 
At the end of an exchange, some portion of Alice 
and Bob’s shared bit sequence might be used as 
an encryption key as well, although doing so 
involves greater risk than using the bits as an 
authentication key because leaking partial 
information can make the key vulnerable. 
Privacy amplification techniques might be used 
to reduce Eve’s information in this case [Bennett 
et al., 1995]. More on the potential for Eve 
guessing bit values is discussed in following 
sections. 
 
  
1.2 Example 
This section illustrates the protocol with a step-
by-step example, referring to Figure 1.  In the 
figure, “EA(…)” means a message encrypted 
with the secret key shared by Alice and Tr, and 
“EB(…)” respectively for Bob; “/” and “\” are 
diagonally polarized photons; “--“ and “|” are 
rectilinearly polarized photons; and “T” is an 
entangled photon. 
 
1. Alice requests an authentication ticket 
to communicate with Bob, sending the 
request encrypted under the symmetric 
key shared with Tr. 
2. Tr sends the location, basis, and 
polarization of the tamper detection bits 
to both Alice and Bob, encrypted under 
their respective secret keys. 
 
3. Tr sends a stream of photons to both 
Alice and Bob, with tamper detection 
bits at offset 2, 5, 9, 13, 14, …; and 
entangled photons in all other positions. 
4. Alice and Bob measure their entangled 
photons and tamper detection photons.  
They then compare the results of the 
tamper detection photon measurements 
with the information received from Tr. 
5. Alice sends the result of her entangled 
photon measurements to Bob.   
6. Bob compares the string received from 
Alice with his measurement.  A perfect 
match with Bob’s result authenticates 
Alice. 
 
 
2 Analysis of Security 
Properties 
 
This section considers possible attacks against 
the protocol and examines parameters required 
for a desired level of security. 
2.1 Intercept-resend attack 
 
Suppose that Eve intercepts the photon stream 
going to either Alice or Bob, and resends.  In this 
case, she must guess the basis for the tamper 
detection bits, guessing incorrectly 50% of the 
time.  Alice  (or Bob) will measure the tamper 
detection bits according to the basis sent by Tr.  
If the tamper detection bits have not been 
measured by Eve, then the polarization measured 
by Alice will agree with that sent by Tr 100% of 
the time and Alice will observe an error rate of 0.  
If the tamper detection bits have been measured 
by Eve, then Alice will observe an error rate of 
.25.   
 
Guessing which bits are for tamper detection and 
which for the authentication key is not a feasible 
strategy.  Tamper detection bits are interspersed 
randomly, so the chance of picking the correct k  
key bits out of dk + bits is , which 
will be extremely small for reasonable values of 
and , where  is the number of 
authentication key bits and d  the number of 
tamper detection bits.  Eve could try guessing a 
subset of the bits, hoping to get all k  key bits 
without disturbing the tamper detection bits.  The 
chance of this strategy succeeding for guessing a 
total of g bits is a product of the probability of 
getting all  key bits and the probability of 
disturbing a tamper detection bit: 
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Eve has a tradeoff in that increasing the number 
of guessed bits, g, increases her chances by 
making it more likely to get all k key bits, but 
decreases them by raising the probability that an 
error detection bit will be disturbed, thus 
revealing her presence. Overall, Eve’s chances of 
success increase as more bits are guessed.  
Reading an extra bit will increase the left side of 
the product by a factor of 
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decrease by a factor of only 0.75 for each extra 
bit guessed.  Therefore Eve’s chances improve as 
long as 175.0
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, or up to a limit of 
.  As shown below, this limit is not 
reached if the probability of falsifying an 
authentication token and the probability of 
evading detection of eavesdropping are balanced.  
The best strategy for Eve, then, is to measure all 
bits and hope that the measurement does not 
induce an error detectable by Alice and Bob.  
Measuring all bits gives a chance of evading 
detection of . . 
4< kg
aD
−= 2
2ln
ln Dk −=
41.2=
k
d
−=

 Dln
 
Suppose we wish to ensure a probability of no 
more than of an intruder falsifying an 
authentication token, and  of evading 
detection of eavesdropping.    The protocol has 
the perhaps unexpected property that more 
tamper detection bits are required than key bits, 
if we want to ensure that  and  are 
approximately equal.   As described above, 
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Values for k and d needed to implement a 
required level of security D are  
 
 DDk ln44.12ln
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d 48.3−=  
  
A reasonable level of security for many 
applications, with D approximately10 6− , can 
then be implemented with  k = 17 and d = 41. 
 
2.2 Distinguishing tamper detection bits 
 
If Eve can distinguish the tamper detection bits 
from other bits, she can avoid detection by 
leaving them undisturbed.  However, the location 
of the tamper detection bits is protected using the 
symmetric keys shared by Tr and the two parties.  
Eve would need to decrypt this information in 
real time, only a few seconds or milliseconds, for 
it to be useful because it is of no value after 
Alice and Bob have completed their 
measurements.  Physical means cannot be used 
to distinguish between entangled and non-
entangled bits if Eve has access to only one path 
(Tr-Alice or Tr-Bob), and thus only one of each 
pair, because the ability to do so would imply 
faster than light communication.   
 
2.3 Multiple photon splitting 
 
A persistent problem in quantum communication 
implementations is the difficulty of achieving 
single photon states.  Signals normally contain 
zero, one, or multiple photons in the same 
polarization.  The multiple photon splitting, or 
photon number splitting, attack on quantum 
protocols involves the eavesdropper 
deterministically splitting off one photon from 
each multi-photon signal [Brassard et al., 1999; 
Huttner et al., 1995].  If Eve measures every 
single photon and passes along n-1 photons 
undisturbed from each multi-photon state, then 
her chances of evading detection are increased 
because the number of tamper detection bits that 
are effective is reduced to , where  is 
the probability of a single photon state, and the 
chance of evading detection becomes .   
Defending against this attack requires increasing 
the number of tamper detection bits by a factor 
of  to reduce the chance of evading 
detection to an acceptable level. 
dpd 1'≈ 1p
75. d '0
1
1
−p
2.4 Denial of service 
 
The ability to write to or disconnect any channel 
would allow an attacker to disrupt 
communication, but this weakness is inherent in 
any non-redundant communication system.  The 
protocol is therefore suited to networks where 
channels are assumed to be observable, but 
cannot be jammed or disconnected. 
 
 
 
3 Related Work 
 
Zeng and Guo [2000] also describe an 
authentication protocol based on using entangled 
pairs.  Their protocol uses previously shared 
secret keys (between each pair of parties) to 
establish a sequence of measurement bases, and 
relies on measurement of error rates, as in BB84, 
to detect the presence of eavesdropping.  Jensen 
and Schack [2000] present a revised version of 
Barnum’s [1999] quantum identification using 
catalysis. Dusek et al. [1998] combine a classical 
authentication protocol with quantum key 
distribution. 
 
 
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This paper describes a protocol for 
authenticating resources in a network using 
properties of quantum entanglement.  The 
protocol has a number of advantages over both 
classical authentication protocols and other 
quantum protocols.  Incorporating conventional 
symmetric cryptography allows eavesdropping 
detection to be separated from key distribution, 
rather than relying strictly on error rates of 
transmitted keys to detect intrusions.  However, 
an intruder would have only a few seconds or 
milliseconds to decrypt classically encrypted 
transmissions between trusted server and 
workstations. 
 
As described, the protocol relies on idealized 
properties, and practical implementations may 
face constraints on transmission efficiency 
resulting from current technology constraints.   
The next step required for realization of the 
protocol is a thorough analysis of effects of these 
constraints.  In particular, multiple rounds of 
photon distribution between the trusted server 
and network resources are likely to be required 
as a result of limits on detection efficiency.  
Measurements of the efficiency of current 
implementation schemes, particularly parametric 
down conversion and weak coherent pulse 
methods, will be needed.   
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Alice Bob 
1. Alice ->Tr: EA(Bob) 
2. Tr->Alice: TT/TT-TTT/TTT\\... 2. Tr->Bob: TT/TT-TTT/TTT\\... 
3. Tr->Bob:   
EB(2,/: 5,-: 9,/: 13,\: 14,\...) 3. Tr-> Alice: 
EA(2,/: 5,-: 9,/: 13,\: 14,\...) 
5. Alice->Bob: prediction (result) 
4. Measure 4. Measure 
 
Figure 1.  Protocol Example 
 
 
